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Abstract 
The discussants have raised a number of interesting points, with par-
ticular attention to the Bayesian/frequentist synthesis, the use of Rao-
Blackwellization, and the impact of improper posteriors. We respond to 
many of their concerns, and raise a few more. 
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First of all, I want to thank the organizers of the meeting, Professors Jose 
Bernardo and Elias Moreno for providing such a lively forum for the exchange of 
many stimulating ideas. Then I want to thank all of the discussants, who have 
raised so many interesting points and concerns that I could keep myself and my 
students busy for many years trying to answer them. For now, I will only try to 
provide a few thoughts. Since we are all working under time constraints, many 
of my comments will not be as complete as I would like them to be, but I still 
hope they will add something. (Indeed, I wish that I had more time to fully 
digest all of the extremely interesting points raised by the discussants, many 
with which I wholeheartedly agree.) 
It seems to be most logical to arrange my responses by subject rather than 
people, and I will start with the one that, perhaps evoked the most comments. 
1 The Bayes/Frequentist Synthesis 
It is gratifying that most people agree that, as statisticians, our main concern 
should be to solve problems as best as we can, and use whatever tools are avail-
able. Such are the sentiments of Professors Berger, Gustafson and Wasserman, 
Ferrandiz, Peiia, and Strawderman, with Berger raising a particularly interest-
ing point. My Examples 1 and 2 indeed show how the tools of one approach can 
help the other approach. The question of the inference, to me, is a somewhat 
different one in that the appropriate inference is a decision of the experimenter. 
Although I believe that, in many cases, the frequentist inference is the appro-
priate one, there are situations where a Bayesian inference is more appropriate. 
Again, even in the question of inference, there is no (or, at least, little) need 
to argue. In consultation with the statistician, the experimenter should decide 
on the appropriate inference, and the statistician should help the experimenter 
make that inference in the best way possible. 
The point is that we shouldn't have Bayesian and frequentist statisticians, 
we should have Bayesian and frequentist inference, to be appropriately used and 
recommended by all statisticians. 
2 Computational Algorithms 
At the very least, I am heartened that some of this work has resulted in people 
being sensitized (but not in the sense of Professor Meng) to the impact of the 
algorithm on the inference. The concerns of Professor Peiia are well founded, and 
the guidelines of Professor llios Insua are quite important. As Professor Schafer 
points out, focusing on the algorithm may be one step removed from our ultimate 
purpose, but it is an important step. As we will see in Section 4.2, problems 
can appear even with seemingly reasonable MC estimators. But even more 
importantly, I believe that we are all beginning to approach theoretical problems 
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in a new way, always thinking of the computations, and being concerned more 
with algorithms than theorems. Such an approach can only enhance our thinking 
and broaden our influence. 
3 Posterior Distributions 
The power variance priors of model (4) are mainly chosen because (i) experi-
menters tend to believe that improper priors reflect impartiality and (ii) they 
result in easy to simulate conditionals. As Professor Peiia notes, the Jeffreys 
priors considered by Ibrahim and Laud (1991) indeed give proper posterior dis-
tributions, as will Professor Bernardo's reference priors, as they both control the 
tail at zero. Any reanalysis with these priors will result in coherent inferences, 
the only drawback being that the conditional distributions are not as easy to 
sample from. However, the inferences are definitely superior. 
The popularity of the power prior is an example of the algorithm overshadow-
ing the statistics. Experimenters were so keen to make the Gibbs sampler work 
that they forgot to check the fundamentals of the model. Moreover, choosing 
a= b = 0 in (4), which usually is justified through an invariance argument, is 
extremely unfortunate as, for example, a = b = 1/2 would yield easily obtained 
conditionals and proper posterior distributions. 
Many discussants had extremely interesting comments and concerns about 
this topic. I can loosely group those concerns in the following subsections. 
3.1 Incompatibility 
The property of compatibility of densities has received a lot of comment, and I 
am heartened that the discussants feel that this property is as important as Jim 
Hobert and I do. I should first mention that, in response to Professors Garcia-
Lopez and Gonzalez, the results of Theorem 2 hold for the Data Augmentation 
Algorithm, which can be considered bivariate (but possibly vector valued) Gibbs 
sampling. 
Professor Meng's discovery of his equation (1) is very interesting. It is one 
of those neat facts that, in hindsight, are totally obvious but, in foresight, are 
maddeningly difficult to see. I am not aware of the history of the representation, 
but had seen in presented as a special case of the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem 
by Robert (1996, Section 5.1.4, Lemma 5.3). It is a wonderful learning equation. 
Professor Liu's comments on incompatible densities are also very interest-
ing, and I would like to discuss how they fit in with Theorem 2. In Liu's 
notation, ft and h are proper densities which are not functionally compatible, 
but T:c(x,x') = J ft(xJy)h(yJx')dy and its counterpart Ty define positive re-
current transition functions. In some sense this is "almost as good" as being 
compatible, as there will exist limiting probability distributions. Thus, although 
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the inference is more complicated, there is a legitimate inference to be recovered 
here. 
The key fact that gets these limiting distributions is that Tx and Ty define 
positive recurrent Markov chains. But what happens in the functionally com-
patible (but not compatible ) case? In this case, again using Liu's notation, the 
marginal distributions 1r1 and 1r2 will not be proper. This follows because, for 
example, J 1r1 (y) dy = J J 1r1 ( x, y) dxdy and, by Theorem 2, this latter integral 
must be oo, or else the densities would be compatible. Thus, the situation il-
lustrated by Professor Liu cannot occur in the functionally compatible, but not 
compatible, case. As an example, consider the exponential densities of Example 
3, which are not compatible. There we have 
and the invariant distribution is 1r1 (x) = 1/x, which is easily verified to be the 
solution to 1r1(x) = fTx(x,x 1)1rJ(x')dx', and is not a proper distribution. 
Perhaps Professor Liu has uncovered a property more fundamental than 
compatibility. Compatibility will insure the existence of one limiting probability 
distribution, but if Tx and Ty define positive recurrent Markov chains there will 
be a collection of limiting probability distributions. In some cases, this may be 
enough to recover a reasonable statistical inference. Which leads us to sub chains 
and submodels and the discussions of Professors George and Berger. 
3.2 Inferences from an Improper Posterior 
The arguments of Professor George are not compelling, because in every case 
the full Gibbs chain clearly contains extraneous pieces. To put it more formally, 
suppose that we are interested in inference about the parameter {3, and have a 
model that results in the full, improper posterior 7r(a,f31y), where a is another 
parameter of the model, considered as a nuisance parameter when the inference 
is about {3. Inferences about {3 would be based on the marginal posterior 7r(f31y), 
which should satisfy 
7r(f31y) = j 7r(a,f31y)da. 
If so, then it is impossible for 7r(f31y) to be proper, as 
j 7r(f31y)df3 = j 7r(a,f31y)dadf3 = oo. 
Thus there is no meaningful inference about the parameter {3 that can be re-
covered from the full model. (I also suspect that any inference about {3 in this 
model would be incoherent in the sense of Heath and Sudderth 1989). 
So what about the experience of Berger, and the examples of George? These 
are instances in which there is reason to abandon the full model. That is, the 
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transformations of George, and the "identifiability" of Berger are procedures 
for changing the model. In my illustration above, the parameter a would be 
somehow eliminated, and only f3 would be considered, with a proper 7r(/3Jy). 
So my point is that if a model results in an improper full posterior, there is 
no lower dimensional inference, based on the full model that can make sense. 
However, there may be a lower dimensional model that makes sense. I have no 
problem with this solution, but realize that the model is being changed in a 
fundamental way; we are not recovering anything from the improper posterior 
distribution. The interesting procedure discussed by Meng, that of recursive 
deconditioning seems to be an excellent candidate for searching for such lower 
dimensional models 
3.3 Fixing Impropriety 
If the posterior distribution is improper, an obvious fix is to replace it with a 
sufficiently "vague" proper prior that is close to it. This is the spirit of Berger's 
suggestion to constrain a > 0 in Example 4. As the values of a do not spend 
too much time near the singularity at zero (as noted at the end of Example 
4), the constrained prior might be a reasonable approximation here. However, 
such a fix may not always work. Natarajan and McCulloch (1996) investigate 
the effects of replacing improper priors with vague, proper priors and find that 
there is no happy medium between "proper but diffuse" and "improper". In 
particular, in situations where the posterior does not exist, the Gibbs sampler 
can break down before the prior becomes diffuse enough to yield estimates that 
are reasonable approximations to the MLE. But I guess that my sentiments 
on this problem are most in line with Gustafson and Wasserman, when they 
state that to use a proper vague prior is " .. simply to approximate an ill defined 
solution". 
The behavior of this Gibbs chain also answers the comment of Rios In-
sua, who expected more mass near zero. Such behavior was not exhibited by 
the chain, even with many restarts and many long runs (which should have 
eliminated any problems due to sample size or starting points - a concern of 
Garcia-Lopez and Gonzalez). This also illustrates, once again, the (apparent) 
futility of trying to have the Gibbs output check itself for propriety. 
4 Rao-Blackwellization 
The technique of Rao-Blackwellization has expanded beyond the original idea 
of conditioning on a sufficient statistic. Indeed, in my thinking, it has expanded 
to encompass a class of techniques that aim at improving estimators by taking 
advantage of the structure of the problem in whatever manner is available. 
I don't believe that we have returned to the status quo, as stated by Berger. 
Even in situations where we end up with the same procedures, we also end up 
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learning a lot (the gains of Rao-Blackwellization can be huge, and easy to ob-
tain) and have not always returned to the status quo (the full Rao-Blackwellized 
estimator is still the only one to achieve substantial gains while retaining unbi-
asedness.) Although Femindiz rightly points out that the Rao-Blackwellization 
in the paper only applies to algorithms with ancillary random variables, the 
general approach goes far beyond this case. Perhaps the most important contri-
bution is that we have stimulated thinking to search for better ways to process 
the output, searches that have resulted in procedures such as those put forth 
by Professors Phillipe and Strawderman which, in our expanded definition, are 
again some sort of Rao-Blackwellization. 
Rao-Blackwellization is a type of smoothing, and the advantages of such 
smoothing are well documented. I was particularly interested in the interpreta-
tions of Professor Dawid that cast new light on importance sampling, accept-
reject, and weighted averages. Dawid's discussion clearly shows the drawback of 
the naive accept-reject average, and the advantage of the "Rao-Blackwellization" 
brought on by importance sampling. 
Before replying to some of the other comments on Rao-Blackwellization, I 
would like to elaborate on a small point that has intrigued me for a while. 
Although it is clear that importance sampling is a desirable technique when 
compared to accept-reject or Metropolis-Hastings averages, its usefulness in 
the Gibbs sampler is not at all clear. For a bivariate Gibbs sampler (X1 , Y1), 
(X2, Y2), · · ·, (Xm, Ym), where we generate Xi "' j(xiYi) and YiH "' f(yiXi), 
a Gibbs estimate Oa = ! 2:::~ 1 h(Xi) has an importance sampling counterpart 
01s = ~ 2:::~ 1 1{J(~~) h(Xi) (ignoring the possibility that the marginal f(x) 
may not be computable). An interesting fact is that 
so, here, the naive Gibbs average is the "Rao-Blackwellization" of the impor-
tance sampling estimate. However, dominance does not follow immediately, 
as there are covariances to contend with. But, I can show that for m = 2, 
var(oa) < var(ois). Thus, this may be saying that the Gibbs sampler is already 
"smooth enough", and there is no room for further smoothing. 
4.1 Termwise Rao-Blackwellization 
First a short comment on the discussions of Liu and Dawid about termwise 
conditioning, and the importance of the stopping rule-it cannot be ignored. 
The stopping rule brings us the fact that the accept-reject estimator (10) is 
both unbiased and "correct for constants". This is perhaps more clear when the 
estimator is written in the form (9), which can only be done with the knowledge 
of the value of t, that is, with knowledge of the stopping rule. The estimator 
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rhs of Liu's discussion, that is, 
(1) 
cannot be directly related to either (9) or (10). It is a Rao-Blackwellization of 
under independent sampling and 
var(Jo) 
n 
var[L E(Joi IYi)] + E[var(Jo1Y1, · · · Yn)] 
i=l 
var[Jrs] + E[var(JoJYI, · · · Yn)] 
> var[Jrs]. 
But this does not prove dominance of (1) over JAR of (10) and, indeed, this is 
not the case as bAR will dominate for constant functions as indicated by Table 2. 
So, in fact, without correcting for constants, or taking into account the stopping 
rule, neither b"rs nor Jo are particularly attractive estimators. 
Professors Liu and Dawid also make similar points about the desirability 
of using weights based on marginal chains, where possible. The marginaliza-
tion seems to smooth things out, and make it sometimes possible to achieve 
variance reduction. However, there are some unforeseen pitfalls here-a built 
in computational difficulty in the marginalization. There is a need for trade-
off in that the original algorithms will often replace an analytic calculation 
with computer time and random variable generation, and the marginalization 
may require a difficult analytic calculation, a point noted by Liu. For exam-
ple, the proposal of Dawid, which seems to carry along with it some excel-
lent variance reduction potential, also carries along a large computational bur-
den. The following simple example was pointed out by Christian Robert, where 
we take 1r(y) ex exp( -y2 /2) , q(yjx) ex exp( -[x2 + y2]/2) and the resulting 
a(x, y) = min{7r(y)q(xJy)/7r(x)q(yJx), 1}, the usual Metropolis-Hastings choice. 
We then get a f3(x) of the form 
f3(x) = cf>(Jxl- x)- cJ>(-Jxl- x) 
+ exp~/4) { 1- cJ>[h(ixl- x)] + cJ>[-h(Jxl + x)]} 
making for a difficult simulation algorithm. Perhaps this problem should be 
approached using decision theory, where we balance ease of computation with 
variance reduction through a loss function. 
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4.2 Subtleties 
Next, I would like to elaborate on the point made by Gustafson and Wasserman 
about the failure of the average of conditional densities (ACD) to accurately 
estimate the marginal. At first, their example was bewildering to me, and there 
seemed to be no reason for such behavior. To better understand the "paradox" I 
reduced it to bare essentials, and learned the following. The failure of the ACD 
estimate has nothing to do with Gibbs sampling, impropriety, or Markov chains. 
It is, in fact, a failure to satisfy the assumptions of the Lebesgue Dominated 
Convergence Theorem! 
Consider that in their example all of the relevant distributions are proper, 
and the Ergodic Theorem applies. Thus, if we obtain the random variables 
u1, u2 , ···,we must have for each t 
m . 
1 "' (i) J ;;:;; ~ 1l"u21u,y(tlu , y)-+ 1l"u21u,y(tlu, y)m(uly)du, 
i=l 
(2) 
where m(uly) is the proper marginal distribution of u. So (2) holds for each t 
in the Gustafson/Wasserman example. It seems that there is a real mystery as 
to why the convergence fails at 0. But a little reflection brings an interesting 
realization. Write 
1T"(Oiy) =lim 1l"u21y(tly) =lim /1l"u21u y(tlu, y)m(uly)du. 
t-+0 t-+0 ' 
At t = 0, indeed for any t =to, the Monte Carlo sum converges to 
! t 1l"u21u,y(Oiu(i), y) -+ J 1l"u21u,y(Oiu, y)m(uly)du = J J~ 1l"u21u,y(tlu, y)m(uly)du. 
t=l 
Thus, when we construct a Monte Carlo sum such as in (2), we are implicitly 
interchanging the order of limit and integration! It is straightforward to check 
that Dominated Convergence will hold here for every to > 0, but fails at to= 0. 
This example illustrates that things can go wrong even when all distributions 
are proper. 
4.3 Other Estimates 
Comparing the performance of Rao-Blackwellization to a weighted bootstrap, 
or double bootstrap, as suggested by Garcia-Lopez and Gonzalez, would be an 
interesting endeavor. As these procedures are related to importance sampling, 
we would expect reasonable performance and perhaps easy implementation. I 
hope to look into this in the future. 
There were other very interesting competitors to the Rao-Blackwell improve-
ment suggested by other discussants. First, I would like to further explore the 
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control-variate estimator proposed by Strawderman, and try to understand why 
it does so incredibly well. The simple answer seems to be that it is based on a 
much bigger sample size. But the more interesting answer is that it takes even 
better advantage of the algorithmic construction. 
I think of control variates as finding the appropriate unbiased estimator of 
zero. To improve on an estimator Oo(x) by the method of control variates, we 
find another estimator u(x), with known mean Jt, and construct o1 (x) = o0 (x) + 
b[u(x)- Jt] for some constant b. Then o0 and J1 have the same expected value, 
and var( o1 ) = var( Jo) + var( u) + 2cov( J0 , u). If we choose b to have the optimal 
value b = -cov(o0 , u), then we achieve the maximal variance reduction var(o1 ) = 
(1- p2)var(o0 ), where pis the correlation between J0 and u. Strawderman has 
given us a methodology for implementing such a control variate scheme in any 
importance sampler. And why does it do so much better? The answer lies in his 
calculation of flc. In a control variate scheme, this is a known parameter, and 
Strawderman estimates it by taking a very large sample from g. So, in effect, 
his estimator is based on a much larger sample size than Orr or OJSr· Is this 
an unfair comparison? You bet it is! Is this an unfair estimator. No! In fact, 
it shows us another clever way of recycling the rejected random variables! This 
control variate scheme deserves further investigation. I would be very interested 
in seeing how it compares to Orr or Oisr when we keep the number of generated 
random variables the same for each estimator. 
The discussion of Professor Phillipe is literally brimming with ingenious 
ideas that not only yield new (and seemingly excellent) estimators, but also 
illustrates the benefits of intertwining algorithmic and statistical thinking. Her 
Riemann sum estimator (1) appears to be a serious competitor to all of the 
other estimators developed in these pages, but I think the most interesting 
developments are in her subsequent estimator, where the instrumental density 
g is chosen to satisfy the boundedness requirements of her Propositions 1 and 
2. What a terrific blending of algorithms and theory! The use of the Gibbs 
average as a substitute for the marginal also has nice potential, although one 
must be on guard for difficulties such as those illustrated in Section 4.2. 
5 Other Concerns 
5.1 Multiple Paths 
The question of multiple path Gibbs sampling was raised by both Bernardo and 
Garcia-Lopez and Gonzalez, although in different contexts. Firstly, the number 
of paths used in the Gibbs sampler will not have any impact on propriety or 
compatibility, as these are properties of the underlying model, and the manner 
in which we observe the model cannot have any bearing. The question of how 
multiple paths can affect the variance of our estimate is also an interesting one, 
and prompted me to write the following. 
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Suppose that we have data Y, and want to calculate an estimate o(Y) of 
T = E[o(Y)]. Using a Monte Carlo algorithm to calculate o(Y) , we obtain an 
output string from the algorithm, a sample Tk of length k, and calulate ok(Y) 
as our approximation of o(Y). Note that we could refer to o(Y) as 000 (Y), the 
value of the estimate based on an infinite sample from our algorithm, that is, 
a sample Too of infinite length. We then also have that E[ok(Y)IToo] = o(Y). 
Now suppose that we run the algorithm many times ( for example, a multiple 
path Gibbs sampler), and let T1, · · ·, Tm be m independent output strings from 
the algorithm, each of size k. For each Ti calculate the values oii) and taks 
as our estimate 6k = !_ 2::1 oii). The following variance analysis, which may 
be similar in spirit to those discussed by Schafer, should apply whether we are 
considering Bayesian or frequentist measures. 
The variance of 6k is given by 
var[6k(Y)] = var(E[6k(Y)IToo]) + E[var(6k(Y)IToo)] 
= var[o(Y)] + E[var(8k IT 00)]) (3) 
= _!_var(o*) + _!_E[r2J, 
m m 
where r2 = var(o~i)ITi), the variance that is only due to the algorithm, and is 
not due to the model. Now we can see the effect of multiple paths (m) and 
increasing the length of the chain (k). As k -+ oo, Tf -+ 0, so increasing the 
length of the chain will reduce the variation due to the algorithm and also 
diminish the effect of Rao-Blackwellization (but, as we saw in Section 5.2, not 
erase it). However, increasing m, the number of paths, has no direct effect on Tf, 
but will reduce var(o0 ) and var(o*). But this latter situation is less desirable, as 
we should strive to eliminate the variation due solely to the algorithm (which is 
under our control). Thus, this naive analysis seems to show that there is less to 
be gained in variance reduction, whether the criterion is Bayesian or frequentist, 
from running multiple chains. 
Equation (3) may also answer the concern of Rios Insua that our stream 
of "endless data" eliminates the role of Bayesian statistics. Indeed, a more 
careful analysis of (3), and the effects of changing k and m would almost certain 
need some form of prior input to help balance the effects of the model and the 
algorithm. 
5.2 Accurate Approximations 
Professor Strawderman reminds me of one of my own lessons, that of not forget-
ting that we are statisticians with a large box of tools. He brings the methods 
of higher-order asymptotics to bear on the Gibbs sampler, showing that the Di-
Ciccio/Martin tail probability approximation results in an extremely accurate 
approximation to the desired posterior probability in Section 5.1. Bravo. Pro-
fessors DiCiccio and Wells also note the place for higher-order asymptotics, and 
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make an interesting point about recovering a frequentist inference in the face 
of the Bayesian "catastrophe". Of course, whether the posterior distribution is 
proper has no bearing on the frequentist inference, which can always be made. 
However, under such catastrophic priors, such as a= b = 1, the Gibbs sampler 
can not be used to produce reasonable frequentist inferences. Indeed, conjec-
turing based on the results of Nataran and McCulloch (1996), such catastrophic 
priors could leave us quite far from reasonable frequentist inference. 
Also, as noted by DiCiccio and Wells, there is much interest now in "proba-
bility matching", or finding prior distributions (such as Welch-Peers) that result 
in posterior probabilities that match frequentist probabilities. Although such 
priors are necessarily improper, they also necessarily must result in proper pos-
terior distributions, hence avoiding the impropriety problems. This suggests 
that probability matching could be a reasonable basis for choosing a default 
prior and should be acceptable to an experimenter as an "impartial" choice. 
Moreover, I think there is still room for Rao-Blackwellization for, at the very 
least, it will serve to minimize the error due solely to the Monte Carlo algorithm. 
5.3 Decision Theory 
It is quite gratifying that the mixing of Decision Theory with algorithmic per-
formance is viewed favorably by many of the discussants. The sentiments of 
Fernindiz perhaps most closely reflect my own, in that I am hopeful for many 
benefits from embedding the algorithm in the appropriate decision problem. 
The research here is still in the beginning stages, so although we have in-
teresting possibilities, there are still few definite recommendations. I have no 
answer for Berger on the performance of the optimal minimax scan, but it seems 
that the calculations of Professors DiCiccio and Wells hold promise that we are 
looking at a good criterion. They have provided more convincing evidence that 
the risk function does a more complete job in capturing the essentials of the 
Markov chain. 
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